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Barnett v. Harrison' concerned the correctness of a trilogy of
judgments2 of the Supreme Court of Canada which have stood for
the basic proposition of contract law that a condition precedent
expressed in a contract may not be waived unilaterally, notwith-
standing that the condition was inserted and intended for the sole
benefit of the party seeking to waive it unless the contract expressly
provides such a power to waive.
In the initial and leading case, Turney v. Zhilka, 3 a contract for
the purchase and sale of land was made conditional upon the
property being "annexed to the village of Streetsville and a plan is
approved by the Village Council for subdivision." 4 Spence J., then
sitting in the High Court of Ontario, found this condition was one
introduced "for the sole benefit of the purchaser and that he could
waive it". 5 However, on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada,
Judson J. speaking for the Court in response to this argument, held:
I have doubts whether this inference may be drawn from the
evidence adduced in this case but, in any event, the defence falls
to be decided on broader grounds. The obligations under the
contract, on both sides, depend on a future uncertain event, the
happening of which depends entirely on the will of a third party
- the Village council. This is a true condition... upon which
the existence of the obligation depends. Until the event occurs,
there is no right to performance on either side[emphasis added].
6
Judson J.'s "doubts" that the condition was solely for the benefit of
the purchaser derived from the fact that the vendor intended to retain
*C. S. Barnett, LL.B. (Ott.), of the Ontario Bar.
1. (1975), 5 N.R. 131; 57 D.L.R. (3d) 225 (S.C.C.), affg [1973] 2 O.R. 176
(C.A.), affg [1971] 3 O.R.'821 (H.C.).
2. Turney v. Zhilka, [1959] S.C.R. 578; 18 D.L.R. (2d) 447; F. T. Developments
v. Sherman, [1969] S.C.R. 203; O'Reilly v. Marketers Diversified Inc., [1969]
S.C.R. 741; 6 D.L.R. (3d) 631.
3. [1959] S.C.R. 578; 18 D.L.R. (2d) 447.
4. Id. at 582; 18 D.L.R. (2d) at 449.
5. Id. at 583-84; 18 D.L.R. (2d) at 450.
6. Id. at 583; 18 D.L.R. (2d) at450.
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adjoining land. 7 Consequently, whether or not the land was annexed
and subdivided would continue to concern him after closing. The
"broader grounds" upon which Judson J. allowed the appeal may,
therefore, have been dicta. But no such "doubts" existed in the
subsequent cases of F. T. Developments v. Sherman8 and O'Reilly
v. Marketers Diversified Inc. 9 in that the vendor adduced no
evidence of any continuing concern in the satisfaction of the
condition such as adjoining land to be retained, etc. In both cases,
the Court adopted and applied the Turney principle that no unilateral
right to waive such external conditions would be implied in favour
of the party for whose sole benefit they were inserted and intended.
The cases draw a distinction between (1) true external conditions
which neither party has promised to perform but depend, at least
partly, on the will of a third party, and (2) conditions which one
party has promised to satisfy himself - performance of the latter
type of condition by the promisor may be waived by the
promisee-beneficiary who may thus accept less than he bargained
for but the contract remains otherwise the same. Satisfaction of the
first type may not unilaterally be waived by either party, for the
implication by the court of such a power of waiver would be
tantamount to re-writing the contract. 10
Lower courts applied" the basic Turney rule and it remained
intact and unqualified until the recent decision of Beauchamp v.
Beauchamp12 in which the Supreme Court affirmed (without
hearing counsel for the respondent, and without reasons) the
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal' 3 permitting a purchaser in
an agreement for the purchase and sale of land to waive the
following conditions:
This sale is conditional for a period of 15 days ... upon the
Purchaser ... being able to obtain a first mortgage in the amount
7. Id. at 580; 18 D.L.R. (2d) at448.
8. [1969]S.C.R. 203.
9. [1969]S.C.R. 741; 6D.L.R. (3d) 631.
10. Turney v. Zhilka, [1959] S.C.R. 578 at 583; 18 D.L.R. (2d) 447 at 450;
O'Reilly v. Marketers Diversified Inc., [1969] S.C.R. 741 at 743; 6 D.L.R. (3d)
631 at 633.
11. Jackson v. Executors of Farwell Estate, [1961] O.R. 322 (C.A.); Dacon
Construction Ltd. v. Karkoulis, [1964] 2 O.R. 139 (H.C.); Genern Investments
Ltd. v. Back, [1969] 1 O.R. 694 (H.C.); Dennis v. Evans, [1972] 1 O.R. 585
(H.C.); LeStrange v. Juda, [1973] 1 O.R. 588 (H.C.); Aldercrest Developments
Ltd. v. Hunter, [1970] 2 O.R. 562 (C.A.).
12. (1974), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 160 (S.C.C.).
13. [197312 O.R. 43 (C.A.).
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of $10,000.00 . . . otherwise, this offer shall be null and void.
This offer is also conditional for a period of 15 days. . upon the
Purchaser . . . being able to secure a second mortgage in the
amount of $2,500.00 . . . otherwise, this offer shall be null and
void .... 14
The purchaser arranged a first mortgage of $12,000.00 and called
on the vendor to close. Gale C.J.O. found the conditions to be
solely for the protection of the purchaser and permitted him to waive
them. Cases supporting the Turney rule were distinguished on the
basis that ".. . the condition herein is not such as is dealt with in
those cases." 15 This is not a distinction compelling in its logic nor
is there any reasonable distinction in principle, and yet the result is
obviously just.
Most recently, Bouck J. of the British Columbia Supreme Court
held in Matrix Construction Ltd. v. Chan1 6 that a "condition
inserted for the sole benefit of one party. . . may be waived by the
person for whose benefit it was inserted." 17 Bouck J. understood as
the basis for the Turney, F. T. Developments, and O'Reilly
decisions, either a benefit to the vendor or an improper waiver and,
therefore, concluded that Canadian law permitted waiver of
conditions solely benefitting one party in accordance with other
Commonwealth jurisprudence. 18
In Barnett v. Harrison, an agreement for the purchase and sale of
land was subject to municipal and provincial approvals of the
purchaser's development plans by a specified date. The plans were
not specified in the agreement and the purchaser retained a power to
amend his plans to satisfy the governmental authorities. 19 The
vendor retained no adjoining land nor was there evidence of any
other specific concern the vendor might have for the zoning, etc. of
the land after closing - in fact, at one point, it was admitted that
there was no such concern but that the vendors simply wanted to
avoid the contract and take advantage of a better offer. 20 When the
14. Id. at44.
15. Id. at 45.
16. (1975), 51 D.L.R. 284 (B.C.S.C.).
17. Id. at291.
18. In support of the proposition that a condition precedent may be waived by a
party for whose sole benefit it was intended and inserted, Bouck J. cited two cases:
Raysun Pty. Ltd. v. Taylor (1971), 64 Qd. R. 172 (S.C.) and Gange v. Sullivan
(1966), 116 C.L.R. 418 (H.C. Aust.).
19. See reasons of Dickson J., (1975) 5 N.R. 131 at 135; 57 D.L.R. (3d) 225 at
241.
20. See reasons of Laskin C.J.C., id. at 145-46; 57 D.L.R. (3d) at 229.
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date specified for the satisfaction of the condition approached, it
became apparent that the approvals would not be had, due to the
lethargy of the municipality and not to the fault of the purchaser.
The purchaser sought to waive the condition, take the property as is,
and pay cash on closing. The vendors refused and took the position
that the agreement became null and void for failure of a condition
precedent. 21 In a decision written by Dickson J., a majority of the
full Supreme Court upheld the correctness of the Turney rule and
dismissed the purchaser's suit for specific performance. Laskin C.
J. C. wrote a dissenting opinion in which Spence J. concurred.22
In his decision, Dickson J. listed five reasons why the Turney rule
should remain undisturbed:
(1) ". . the distinction . between (i) the manifest right of A to
waive default by B in the performance of a severable condition
intended for the benefit of A, and (ii) the attemptby A to waive his
own default or the default of C, upon whom depends the
performance which gives rise to the obligation, i.e. the true
condition precedent, seems to me, with respect, to be valid".23
But is not that the question, rather than the answer? Why is the
distinction valid? If a condition is for the sole benefit of the party
seeking to waive it, what difference does it make to the other party
how the condition may be satisfied or even whether it is satisfied at
all or waived?
(2) Where the contract provides a right to waive some conditions but
not others, the court would be re-writing the contract to imply a
right to waive one of those others.24
This point does not deal with the correctness of the Turney rule
but rather with the interpretation of the particular contract in the
case under review. It is a point, however, which bears on most usual
conditional real estate sales agreements, as the usual form of real
estate contract expresses a unilateral right to waive title defects.
(3) In the event the condition is not satisfied, implying a unilateral
right to waive would give to the purchaser an option (for which he
has paid nothing) and could tie up the vendor's lands. Until the final
day the vendor may not know whether the purchaser will waive
21. Id. at 146; 57 D.L.R. (3d) at 229.
22. Chief Justice Laskin's judgment, while recognizing the basis upon which
Turney v. Zhilka proceeded, did not find that it precluded a contrary conclusion. Id.
at 158; 57 D.L.R. (3d) at 240.
23. Id. at 140; 57 D.L.R. (3d) at 246.
24. Id.
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compliance. Dickson J. says this "option" would thus be an
injustice to the vendor, whereas no injustice would accrue to the
purchaser if the transaction failed for an unsatisfied condition
precedent.2
5
This argument fails to consider that the uncertainty which the
vendor faces until the final day exists entirely apart from the
question of waiver. The vendor has agreed that his lands will be tied
up awaiting the uncertainty of the condition being satisfied by an
uncertain event beyond the control of either party. This uncertainty
derives from the nature of a conditional obligation whether or not a
right to waive is implied. It is no injustice to either party.
In a simple agreement for sale, a vendor's only concern is for
timely payment of the purchase price - his effort is to minimize
any possibility that the transaction will not close. A zoning
condition, etc. creates such a possibility and therefore a vendor will
exact a higher price for such conditions. Implying a right in the
purchaser to waive the condition only increases the likelihood of
timely payment of the purchase price as the vendor desired when the
agreement was made. There can be no injustice to the vendor if the
transaction closes at the time and price agreed. It makes no
difference to him, after closing, whether or not the property has a
particular zoning as long as he has been paid the full purchase price
on time - the "option" can cause no injustice to a vendor. On the
other hand, the purchaser in Barnett v. Harrison had gone to the
expense and effort over a twenty month period of hiring architects
and planners and submitting fifteen different proposals to the
municipality. This expense is borne by the purchaser but now
enures to the benefit of the vendors (who have paid nothing) as the
purchaser's efforts must have softened the path to development
somewhat. This result is an injustice to the purchaser.
(4) A straight application of the Turney principle avoids
consideration of "(i) whether the condition is for the benefit of the
purchaser alone or for the joint benefit and (ii) whether the
conditions are severable from the balance of the agreement." 26
25. Id. at 141; 57 D.L.R. (3d) at 247. Dickson J. is not dealing here with questions
of bad faith as, for instance, where the purchaser makes no effort to have the
condition satisfied in order to give himself the "option" which he may then take up
or not depending on the then value of the land. Where such questions of bad faith
arise, clearly there would be no right to waive, but this is not the situation to which
Dickson J. is addressing himself.
26. Id. at 141; 57 D.L.R. (3d) at 247.
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The Turney rule certainly avoids the issue "for whose benefit is
the condition" but no issue should be avoided if it is relevent.
Conspicously absent from the majority reasons is any discussion of
the significance or meaning of a condition being "solely for the
benefit" of one of the parties. The proper question is whether there
is something in the nature of such a condition that ought to imply a
right to waive.
The nature of such a condition is that after the contract is
performed, the non-benefiting party will have gained everything he
bargained for whether or not the condition has been satisfied by
performance. If a condition meets this test, the non-benefiting party
cannot reasonably be heard to object to its waiver because he stands
to get what he bargained for. This test is not a difficult one to apply
but it does require some sympathetic understanding of the bargain
struck. It ought not to be circumvented by the terse logic of Judson
J.'s rule in Turney.Such reasoning, though "logical" in a strictly
legal sense, proceeds without consideration or understanding of the
bargain struck, and cannot be reconciled with Beauchamp v.
Beauchamp.
Respecting Beauchamp, Dickson J. considered:
The patent purpose of the condition was to afford the purchasers
an opportunity of raising the moneys with which to complete the
purchase; in this they were successful and so advised the vendors
timeously. It was of no importance whatever that the funds
required by the purchasers came from a first mortgage for
$12,000 rather than a first mortgage for $10,000 and a second
mortgage for $2,500. That case should, I think, be regarded as
one in which the condition precedent was satisfied and not one in
which it was waived. 2
7
With greatest respect, the conditions in Beauchamp were not
satisfied. Each condition called for a particular mortgage and could
not be satisfied strictly by another. True, it was of no importance to
the vendor because, after closing, he would have what he bargained
for whether or not the conditions had been satisfied strictly or at all,
but this reasoning only applies when one considers that the basic
purpose of the conditions was to enable the purchaser to obtain the
closing funds and not some purpose involving any continuing
concern to the vendor. This is exactly the reasoning that determines
whether a condition is for the sole benefit of one of the parties.
Dickson J. says the conditions were satisfied rather than waived but
27. Id. at 142; 57 D.L.R. (3d) at 248.
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can there be any doubt that the purchaser could have considered the
agreement ended unless he obtained exactly the mortgages specified
in the conditions? The conditions were satisfied only in the sense
that (1) the purchaser was satisfied and (2) it was of no continuing
concern to the vendor whether or not the conditions were satisfied
because either way he stood to get the purchase price on time - this
amounts to a waiver. The test that Dickson J. applies to Beauchamp
is the same test he avoids in Barnett and says ought to be avoided
generally.
(5) Finally, in "the interests of certainty and predictability", the
law should not be changed without compelling reasons; further-
more, if the parties "agree that the rule shall not apply, that can be
readily written into the agreement".28
The "certainty and predictability" argument does not deal with
the correctness of the Turney rule and is properly more applicable to
regulatory laws whose only real importance lies in their being
generally obeyed (e.g. driving on the right hand side of the road)
than it is to a basic principle of contract law. The issue under review
deals specifically with the situation where the parties have neglected
to address themselves to the question of waiver. Therefore, it is no
answer that a right to waive could have been expressly included in
the contract. It would be foolish to assume that parties entering
contracts post-Barnett will consider the question of waiver more
frequently than they did post-Turney etc. It is a fact of life that the
huge majority of contracts are not drawn with reference to every
court decision that might apply (nor should they be expected to) but
rather are drawn in reliance on the parties' basic sense of justice
which assumes that a condition inserted solely for the benefit of one
of the parties does not afford the other party a means of escape from
the contract to take advantage of a better offer. It ought not to be
expected that parties will always address themselves to the question
of waiver notwithstanding total consistency in court decisions.
In expounding the law of contract, the court truly fulfills the
common law function of expounding what the law is rather than
introducing and creating law - contracts have been and will
continue to be a common medium of social exchange independently
of court decisions. To determine what the law of contract is, there
must be an appreciation of the purpose and nature of the contract to
the parties to see where justice lies as between them. This was the
28. Id. at 141; 57 D.L.R. (3d) at 247.
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approach Dickson J. took in his discussion of Beauchamp.
However, the Turney rule proceeds on an entirely different footing:
as a matter of logic and by definition, until a condition precedent is
satisfied, the very contract does not exist and there can be no
question of implying terms into a contract that does not yet exist and
no point in inquiring into the nature and purpose of the condition or
whether it benefits one party solely. It is the writer's opinion that the
Turney approach is wrong in its direction, logic and result, and that
Dickson J.'s defence of that approach in Barnett v. Harrison is
completely hollow.
Unless the Beauchamp distinction (whatever that is) is expanded
and developed in the lower courts, the Turney rule will probably not
be considered again for some time by the Supreme Court. Until
then, Canada may be the only 29 jurisdiction having such a rule and
the compelling dissent of Laskin C.J.C. will serve only for
academic discussion.
29. See (1932), 76 A.L.R. 2d 1204; Godfrey v. Crawford (1964), 126 N.W. 2d
495; Funke v. Paiste (1947), 52 A.2d 655; Major v. Price (1954), 84 S.E. 2d 445;
Pease v. Brown (1960), 8 Cal. Rptr. 917;Hall v. Snipes (1959), 330 S.W. 2d 381;
Maynard v. Goode (1926), 37 C.L.R. 529; Donaldson v. Tracy, [1951] N.Z.L.R.
684 (S.C.); Scott v. Rania, [1966] N.Z.L.R. 527 (C.A.); Mnyandu v. Mnyandu
(1964), 1 S.A.L.R. 418; Van Jaarsveld v. Coetzee (1973), 3 S.A.L.R. 241; see
also cases cited supra, note 18.
